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Organicism and Reductionism in Cancer 
Research: Towards a Systemic Approach
Christophe Malaterre*
In recent cancer research, strong and apparently conflicting epistemological stances have been  
advocated by different research teams in a mist of an ever-growing body of knowledge ignited by  
ever-more  perplexing  and  non-conclusive  experimental  facts:  in  the  past  few  years,  an  
‘organicist’ approach investigating cancer development at the tissue level has challenged the  
established  and  so-called  ‘reductionist’  approach  focusing  on  disentangling  the  genetic  and  
molecular circuitry of carcinogenesis. This article reviews the ways in which ‘organicism’ and  
‘reductionism’  are  used  and  opposed  in  this  context,  with  an  aim at  clarifying  the  debate.  
Methodological, epistemological and ontological implications of both approaches are discussed.  
We argue that the ‘organicist/reductionist’ opposition in the present case of carcinogenesis is  
more  a  matter  of  diverging  heuristics  than  a  claim  about  theoretical  or  ontological  
(ir)reducibility. As a matter of fact, except for the downward causation claim, which we question,  
we  argue  that  the  organicist  arguments  are  compatible  with  the  reductionist  approach.  
Moreover, we speculate that both approaches, which currently focus on specific entities i.e. genes  
versus  tissues,  will  need to  shift  their  conceptual  frameworks  to  studying complex arrays  of  
relationships  potentially  ranging over  several  levels  of  entities,  as  is  the  case  with  ‘systems  
biology’.
1. Introduction
Despite several decades of heavily funded research, cancer still kills millions of people 
every year.1 As a matter of fact, scientific research on this disease is a major societal 
issue; it has also become the theater of a stimulating debate on epistemological stances, 
becoming a renewed battlefield for organicism and reductionism. These two approaches 
have led to the formulation of two opposing theories of cancer: on the reductionist side, 
the Somatic Mutation Theory (SMT) explains cancer by appealing to genetic mutations, 
while on the organicist side, the Tissue Organization Field Theory (TOFT) locates the 
cause of cancer in a disruption of tissue organization. Recently, Marcum (2005) analyzed 
how  organicism  and  reductionism,  taken  as  metaphysical  presuppositions,  shaped 
carcinogenesis research and in turn were shaped by it. In the present contribution, we aim 
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1 The International Agency for Research on Cancer, which is part of the UN World Health Organization, 
estimates the global mortality rate due to cancer at some 8 million deaths per year (based on 2002 data: see  
online epidemiology data on http://www-dep.iarc.fr/); more recent estimates point to 10 million deaths per 
year worldwide (Khayat 2005).
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more specifically at clarifying the debate on these two opposing epistemological stances 
with a view to understanding more specifically on which grounds they really diverge, or 
not, in cancer research. We start by briefly recalling the two views, relying on Robert 
Weinberg and coworkers’ research as representative of the SMT, and on the works of 
Ana Soto, Carlos Sonnenschein and coworkers as illustrative of the TOFT.2 Following 
Ayala  (1974),  we then  articulate  our  analysis  of  organicism/reductionism along three 
dimensions:  methodological,  epistemological  and  ontological.  For  each  of  these 
dimensions, we question the extent to which the SMT and the TOFT stances diverge. 
Finally, we focus on reasons for both approaches to ultimately converge and articulate 
one another into a ‘systems biology’ approach to carcinogenesis. Yet in turn we raise the 
question whether the usage of complex systems theories in carcinogenesis might or not 
open the back door to new kinds of emergence and irreducibility. 
2. Two opposing theories of cancer
The advances in molecular biology over the last three decades have paved the way for a 
genetically anchored theory of cancer, the Somatic Mutation Theory (SMT). This theory 
probably qualifies as ‘mainstream theory’ in that it has harvested most funding on cancer 
research so far. It posits that cancer has its causes rooted in genetic malfunctioning at the 
cellular level. This view of cancer can be traced back to the work of Boveri (1914) and is 
today typically illustrated by the research of Weinberg and coworkers. This reductionist 
approach  was  made  explicit  in  Weinberg’s  book,  One  Renegade  cell (1998)  and 
emphasizes the key role of a single mutated cell in carcinogenesis. An alternative view 
comes from the tradition of developmental biology,  placing the organism at the focal 
point of research, and finds its origin in the work of Waddington (1935) and Needham 
(1936). According to this view, the causes of cancer are to be searched not at the genetic 
level but at the tissue level: for the proponents of the Tissue Organization Field Theory 
(TOFT), cancer originates from a disruption of tissue organization. This hypothesis has 
been investigated for instance by Bissell and coworkers (1984); it is also typically how 
Soto and Sonnenschein define their conceptual framework for research on carcinogenesis, 
an organicist point of view that they have developed in their joint book The Society of  
Cells (1999), while making their epistemological posture even more explicit (Soto and 
Sonnenschein 2005; for a shorter treatment, see Soto and Sonnenschein 2004).
The  approach  of  the  Somatic  Mutation  Theory,  according  to  which  the  cause  for 
cancer is to be searched for at the genetic level, has often been qualified as an example of 
‘reductionism’, and more precisely of ‘genetic reductionism’. The anchoring of the SMT 
within the genetic reductionist paradigm has really emerged in the 1970’s: at that time, it 
was  established  that  a  considerable  number  of  carcinogenic  chemicals  could  cause 
2 Cancer research is an extremely complex field of scientific investigation. In this paper, we focus on two 
ways of looking at cancer development as illustrated by two specific research teams. This bipolarization  
should not be seen as an oversimplification of the cancer research field nor of its history: it serves as an  
anchor point only for our philosophical discussion on organicism and reductionism. For historical views on 
cancer research, see for instance van Helvoort (1999) or Morange (1997).
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genetic  mutations.  Later,  it  was  also  found that  some so-called  tumor  viruses  –  also 
named transforming genes or oncogenes – could lead to the development of tumors by 
carrying mutated genes into the infected cells. A next discovery established that these 
external oncogenes were similar to genes already present in the cell itself; at that point the 
search for a genetic cause of cancer shifted from exogenous to endogenous, and several 
endogenous oncogenes were identified as mutated forms of normal cellular genes. The 
full  complexity  of  cancer  was  yet  to  come as  it  was  later  found that  some cases  of 
carcinogenesis  could  only  be  explained  as  a  multi-step  process  involving  several 
oncogenes,  as  well  as  potentially  one  or  several  anti-oncogenes  or  tumor  suppressor 
genes (for further details, see Weinberg 1998; Hanahan and Weinberg 2000; Han and 
Weinberg 2002). To date, more than 100 oncogenes and 15 anti-oncogenes have been 
identified.  The cell cycle  clock was also found to be of importance,  as well as genes 
responsible for cell immortality. The full-blown picture of today’s understanding of the 
causes of cancer as depicted by Weinberg has extended well beyond intra-cellular genetic 
causes  and  now  also  involves  many  molecular  pathways  including  communication 
signals between cells: carcinogenesis is now seen as resulting from the acquisition by 
tumor  cells  of  six  distinct  capabilities,  namely  “self-sufficiency  in  growth  signals, 
insensitivity to growth-inhibitory (antigrowth) signals, evasion of programmed cell death 
(apoptosis), limitless replicative potential, sustained angiogenesis, and tissue invasion and 
metastasis” (Hanahan and Weinberg 2000, 57). Each of these capabilities can be acquired 
by different  pathways  at  the  molecular  level;  for  instance,  self-sufficiency in  growth 
signals – resulting in autonomous cell growth and proliferation – can be acquired through 
alteration of either extracellular growth signals, transcellular transducers of those signals, 
or  intracellular  circuits  that  translate  these  signals  into  action.  These  six  acquired 
capabilities  would  even  be  enabled  by  a  seventh  characteristic,  genome  instability, 
sometimes also called ‘increased mutability’. The formulation of the SMT has therefore 
been more recently recast in terms of “heterotypic interactions between incipient tumor 
cells  and their  normal  neighbors”  (Hanahan and Weinberg  2000,  67).  The  early  and 
extreme ‘genetic reductionism’ according to which cancer is caused by a faulty gene in a 
single renegade cell has been adapted to accommodate the complexity of carcinogenesis 
and the multitude of molecular pathways leading to proliferation of tumor cells. Yet it 
remains that the SMT focus on molecular entities as the major loci for explanations of 
carcinogenesis.
On the other hand, the approach to cancer proposed by Soto and Sonnenschein and 
their team is anchored in tissue research. The Tissue Organization Field Theory (TOFT) 
finds an explanation of cancer in terms of disruption of tissue organization as opposed to 
expression of a faulty gene. Let us recall that tissues of an organ are typically composed 
of two groups of cells: the parenchyma, made out of the functional cells of that specific 
organ,  and the stroma which keeps the parenchyma in place and is  the name for the 
structural cells of the organ. The TOFT is based on two main premises: (i) proliferation is 
the default state of all cells, and (ii) carcinogens initially act by disrupting the normal 
interactions that take place among the cells in the stroma and parenchyma of an organ 
(Soto & Sonnenschein 2005). According to this view, in healthy organs, the cells of the 
stroma and of the parenchyma act reciprocally upon each other by means of interactions 
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that started earlier, at the time of organogenesis and cell differentiation. Among other 
things,  these  interactions  determine  the  shape  and  the  structure  of  the  organ,  the 
differentiation of its diverse cell types and exert a negative control on cell proliferation, 
i.e. they induce the cells not to proliferate, contrary to what they would do under their 
default state. The disruption of these normal interactions between stroma and parenchyma 
results in abnormal tissue structure, removal of the negative control mentioned above, 
and therefore in cell proliferation.  Hence the cause of carcinogenesis is located in the 
disruption of tissue organization. 
For the proponents of the TOFT, the SMT program operates a ‘reduction’ by which it 
searches for causes of carcinogenesis at the level of the genes and molecular components 
of cells, and not at the aggregate level of tissues: cancer is viewed as an intra-cellular 
problem, caused by mutations  in the DNA of the cancer cell  itself.  According to the 
TOFT view, the critical level at which carcinogenesis causes should be searched for is the 
tissue level because it typically is the level at which, using biopsy, a definitive diagnosis 
of  cancer  can  be  made  (Soto and Sonnenschein,  2005,  112).  Soto  and Sonnenschein 
define  genetic  reductionism  as  follows:  “a  great  number  of  biologists  insist  that 
explanations  should  always  be  sought  for  at  the  gene  and/or  gene  product  level, 
regardless of the level of organization at which the phenomenon is observed. This stance, 
genetic reductionism, […] predicates that everything in biology may be reduced to genes 
because the genome is the only repository of transmissible information” (2005, 104). For 
the TOFT proponents therefore, the approach followed by the SMT researchers is too 
restrictive  and  leads  to  a  narrow framing  of  the  issue  purely  in  terms  of  genes  and 
molecular expressions; it even dooms the cancer research program itself at its very roots, 
and is the main reason for “why it should be dropped and replaced” (Sonnenschein and 
Soto,  2000);  in  other  words,  the  SMT approach  is  criticized  for  oversimplifying  the 
causal determination of cancer to genes and molecules within cells, thereby ruling out the 
investigation of other potential causes such as tissue organization. 
As  substitute  to  genetic  reductionism,  advocates  of  the  TOFT  propose  to  adopt 
organicism: cancer is seen as a problem akin to histogenesis or organogenesis gone awry, 
and thus to a problem of developmental biology. In the words of Soto and Sonnenschein, 
organicists “choose to work at the level of organization at which the studied phenomenon 
is  observed and venture gingerly into  lower levels  of  organization,  moving gradually 
through  the  diverse  hierarchical  levels  of  complexity,  rather  than  jumping  from 
phenotype  to  gene.  Moreover,  since  they  acknowledge  emergent  phenomena,  their 
incursions  into  lower  levels  must  be  followed  by  a  synthesis  of  how  lower  level 
phenomena bear upon upper level phenomena” (Soto and Sonnenschein 2005, 104). It is 
such claims that we wish to analyze more precisely. 
3. A methodological divide: heuristic principles
The  questions  of  organicism/reductionism  pertaining  to  a  methodological  domain 
typically encompass issues concerning the diversity/unity of scientific method as well as 
of research strategy. According to methodological reductionism, all domains of science 
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should use a unique method – rather than several ones – to justify their theories. This 
method  includes,  on  the  one  hand,  usage  of  the  experimental  method  –  confronting 
hypotheses to experiments – and, on the other, reliance on observations as a fuel to the 
discovery process. Proponents of the SMT or of the TOFT do not precisely mention these 
very generic principles of methodological reductionism and on which we would expect 
them to agree. The debate indeed appears to concern not so much the scientific method 
per se but more specifically orientation of the research strategy: a major divide between 
the two approaches to carcinogenesis does concern heuristics. Indeed, the SMT and the 
TOFT appear  in  disagreement  when it  comes  to  the working hypotheses  they use as 
guidelines to their investigation and discovery processes. The proponents of the TOFT 
claim to follow an organicist or holist approach, whereas the SMT is labeled reductionist 
in  this  context.  For  the TOFT proponents,  the process  of discovery is  guided by the 
search  for  explanations  formulated  at  the  level  of  tissues,  which  is  the  level  of 
observation of cancer by biopsy (Soto and Sonnenschein 2005, 112). On the opposite for 
the  SMT  proponents,  the  process  of  discovery  involves  the  search  for  explanations 
formulated in terms of cellular or genetic/molecular entities, therefore respectively one 
and two levels  of  explanation  below the  tissue level.  It  is  therefore  on this  heuristic 
dimension that the two approaches part. The underlying issue is of course how to operate 
the first  ‘cuts’  when one is  investigating  a  very complex problem,  how to select  the 
features which will prove relevant and decisive in providing a satisfactory explanation. In 
this respect, the development of a theory is a historical process strongly influenced by its 
underlying heuristic assumptions. For the SMT, since cancer is assumed to be a disease 
caused by mutated genes, the investigation of carcinogenesis focuses on the search for 
faulty genes. For the TOFT, cancer development is assumed to be a matter of disrupted 
tissue organization; hence the search for cancer causes in tissue disruption patterns. 
Looking  specifically  at  these  heuristic  principles,  Marcum  (2005)  has  recently 
highlighted  the  extent  to  which  they  might  influence  the  scientific  practices  used  to 
examine the nature of cancer in design of experiments and interpretation of experimental 
results.  Marcum  calls  these  heuristic  principles  “metaphysical  presuppositions”  and 
points to the fact that the “metaphysical presuppositions scientists are committed to in 
their practices are indeed ‘heterogeneous’ elements, which not only shape those practices 
and the generation of scientific knowledge […] but, in turn, are also shaped by those 
practices  and knowledge” (2005, 32). Such heuristic principles  should not be seen as 
static elements but, more accurately, as dynamic and malleable components of research 
work, depending on the progress of scientific investigations. Accordingly, the heuristic 
divide between the SMT and the TOFT proponents might very well be a historically-
contingent situation only. 
Let us note that questions on the historical consequences of such a heuristic-contingent 
development of cancer theories are not absent from arguments exchanged by both sides. 
Soto and Sonnenschein for instance clearly refer to the TOFT as a better – in the sense of  
‘faster’  – scientific  route towards a full  understanding of – and therefore a cure of – 
cancer compared to the SMT; of course, proponents of the SMT argue opposite-wise, 
and,  obviously,  only  time  will  tell  in  due  course  which  of  these  two  approaches  to 
carcinogenesis was right, if any. Yet for Soto and Sonnenschein, time-delay is one of the 
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critical  consequences of having adopted wrong heuristic  principles:  “a comprehensive 
understanding  of  carcinogenesis  in  general  […]  has  been  delayed  because  of 
epistemological issues” (Maffini et al, 2004, 1495). And this fact might have an impact 
on the life of millions of people. By pointing to a heuristic-contingent development of 
theories, the study of organicism/reductionism in cancer research raises central questions 
in  the  ‘science  and  public  policy’  arena,  namely  questions  about  the  evaluation  of 
heuristic  principles  and  research  strategies  beforehand,  and  the  induced  societal 
responsibility of associated choices.
The  heuristic-contingent  development  of  cancer  theories  also  raises  a  question  of 
epistemic dimension. Indeed, if one observes that different heuristic principles lead to 
different  historical  paths  of  theoretic  development,  one  might  wonder  whether  these 
different heuristic principles might as well lead to different final destinations, that is to 
say to different, so to speak, ‘final’ theories of cancer. Such a consideration would lead to 
embrace a contingentist view of theories within which the particular phrasings of theories 
contain frozen historical elements of contingency. Following this line of thought, the first 
working hypotheses of a theory under development might determine the ‘final’ structure 
of the very theory itself. Therefore, the fact that the SMT and the TOFT are different 
could be more than a temporary divergence of scientific formulation: it could indeed be 
the early indication of a different ‘final’ theoretical formulation. Of course, at this point 
in time, such line of thought is purely speculative. Yet the future development, or not, of 
two parallel theories capable of explaining cancer at length yet incommensurable to one 
another, might help shed light on this topic. 
4. Epistemological divide: theoretic and explanation (ir)reducibility
Epistemologically,  the  general  question  of  organicism/reductionism translates  into the 
question whether theories  and explanations  formulated in  one field of science can be 
shown to be special cases of theories and explanations formulated in another field. The 
claim  that  carcinogenesis  could  be  reduced  to  molecular  biology  would  entail  that 
theories and explanations of cancer could be reformulated as special cases of molecular 
biology,  and  thereby  solely  by  reference  to  genes  and  molecular  entities.  To  further 
clarify the debate between the SMT and TOFT proponents, we will make the distinction 
between  two  closely-related  concepts  of  epistemological  reduction,  namely  ‘inter-
theoretic  reduction’  and  ‘explanation  reduction’:  whereas  the  first  type  bears  upon 
formulations of theories and as such imposes quite heavy formal constraints, the second 
one appeals to the notion of explanation and allows more room for interpretation.
An  ‘inter-theoretic  reduction’  entails  the  availability  of  at  least  two  formalized 
theories: the reducing theory for one, and the reduced theory for the other. Following the 
inter-theoretic framework proposed by Nagel (1961), the formalization process should 
take  the  form of  an  axiomatization  in  a  formal  language  identical  to  the  first-order 
predicate logic with identity; based on this formalization, the well-known conditions for a 
successful inter-theoretic reduction are conditions of connectivity (terms of the reduced 
theory must be connected to terms of the reducing theory), and of logical deducibility 
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(theoretical  propositions  of  the  reduced  theory  must  be  logically  deducible  from 
theoretical propositions of the reducing theory). Let us note that, in a midst of a prolific 
literature on the topic, such an ‘inter-theoretic reduction’ has been further extended, for 
instance, by Schaffner (1967) so as to encompass not only a syntactic view of scientific 
theories,  but also a semantic  view as well  as cases of succession and replacement  of 
theories. For the purpose of our discussion, it remains that, in any case, an inter-theoretic 
reduction entails an axiomatization of both the reducing and the reduced theory, as well 
as  connectivity  and  derivability  conditions.  Applying  the  ‘inter-theoretic  reduction’ 
scheme to carcinogenesis  would mean that (1) at  least  two sets of theories should be 
available under an axiomatized form – a theory of cancer development on the one hand 
and a theory of genetics and molecular biology on the other – and (2) connectivity and 
derivability conditions should be fulfilled. Yet, these criteria are far from being met as of 
today: being research in progress and continuously appended, the current cancer theories 
are not under an axiomatized form, and for similar reasons nor are genetics and molecular 
biology,  nor  relevant  subsets  of  these.  Consequently,  having  no  theoretical  terms  to 
connect  nor  properly axiomatized  theories  to  derive,  it  is  also not  surprising that  the 
conditions  of  connectivity  and  derivability  would  not  be  met.  The  debate  on 
organicism/reductionism in cancer research would therefore seem quite premature if it 
were to be understood as an inter-theoretic reduction issue. 
An  alternative  would  therefore  be  to  phrase  the  debate  in  terms  of  ‘explanation 
reduction’. In this case, it would not be theories that one would like to reduce to one 
another, but explanations:  if all explanations formulated in one field of science would be 
shown to  be  special  cases  of  explanations  formulated  in  another  field  together  with 
structural information, than the first field would be ‘explanatorily reduced’ to the second 
field.3 The organicism/reductionism debate in carcinogenesis is most likely grounded in 
this  second type  of reduction,  focusing more on explanations  than on theories  as the 
proper  locus  of  reduction,  as  would  tend  to  confirm  this  quotation  from  Soto  and 
Sonnenschein: “by [reductionism] we mean that explanations are sought for at the lowest 
possible level of organization, so that biology can eventually be reduced to chemistry and 
physics. […] In practice, this reductive thrust goes as far down as needed to construct an 
explanation” (2005, 104). In this context, what therefore remains to be clarified is the 
concept of explanation and its usage within the organicist/reductionist debate. 
For this matter,  let  us suppose that we have an explanation E1 of a carcinogenesis 
phenomenon by the SMT, and an explanation E2 of the same phenomenon by the TOFT. 
Let  us  suppose  furthermore  that  E1 is  an  explanation  that  can  be  reformulated  by 
appealing solely to explanations formulated in molecular biology, chemistry or physics 
(lower levels), whereas E2 contains explanatory elements that cannot be reformulated in 
this same manner. In this situation, E1 would be ‘explanatorily reducible’ and not E2. Let 
us  remark  that  this  situation  presupposes  also that  E1 as  well  as  E2 are  indeed  good 
3 A  weaker  formulation  of  this  reduction  would  focus  solely  on  single  explanations  (and  not  on  all 
explanations formulated in a particular field of science). In this case, the reduction would occur between  
explanations (and not between fields of science): if an explanation is shown to be a special case of another  
explanation, then the first explanation could be said to be reduced to the second one in the weaker sense of 
‘explanation reduction’.
7
Preprint – final version published in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 57–73. URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698590701305792
explanations of carcinogenesis, which would mean, according to a pragmatist  view of 
explanation (van Fraassen 1980), that these explanations would not only have a good 
probability to be  true, but also that they would have an important weight compared to 
others in the contrast class (i.e. when answering a particular question rather than another 
one) and that they would in addition bear strong contextual relevance (i.e. when taking 
into account the contextual background of the one asking the question). 
Now, if we go back to the debate on carcinogenesis, it appears that many criticisms 
formulated by proponents of the TOFT about the SMT are, in reality, much more targeted 
at the ‘trueness’ of explanations. Soto and Sonnenschein develop several paradoxes faced 
by the SMT: for instance,  they mention  the fact  that  the SMT has yet  to provide an 
account for carcinogenesis cases involving multiple gene mutations as well as different 
orders  of  appearance  of  these  mutations  (2005,  106-110).  Such criticisms  are  indeed 
showing that  the  SMT cannot  provide  a  good explanation  in  the  sense  of  failing  to 
provide an explanation E1 having a good probability to be true. Yet, if a theory cannot put 
forward a good explanation,  it  is  in  turn pointless  to ask whether  it  can formulate  a 
reducible explanation. This simply is the trait of a ‘work-in-progress theory’, and on this 
aspect, both the SMT and the TOFT are most likely to be put in the same basket since 
there appear to be phenomena that none of them can explain as of today.
To go further on this argument, we need therefore to take for granted the ‘trueness’ of 
E1 and E2, i.e. to suppose that both E1 and E2 have a good probability to be true. In this 
context, TOFT proponents would have a case if indeed the reducible explanation E1 put 
forward by SMT proponents were still shown not to be a good explanation whereas their 
own explanation E2 would actually be good. This could be the case if for instance E1 
would target the wrong element in the contrast class or miss contextual relevance.4 Yet, 
should such a situation be exhibited, would this be problematic for reductionists? Most 
certainly  not  as  this  appears  to  be  illustrative  of  the  type  of  antireductionism  that 
Rosenberg and Kaplan,  for instance,  define as  epistemic  antireductionism:  “epistemic 
antireductionism begins with reasonable assumptions about the presuppositions, interests, 
cognitive characteristics, and background knowledge of informed inquirers, in this case, 
4 To illustrate this possibility, one could imagine the following fictitious scenario: 
(A) E1 and E2 are true explanations of “why Paul got cancer”, 
(B) E1 appeals to molecules (e.g. molecular expression), E2 to tissue characteristics (e.g. wound),
(C) The contrast class more specifically highlights “what was specific about Paul history that made him 
get cancer”,
(D) While it is known that “Paul was wounded and later a cancer grew at the very place of the wound”.
In this case, E2 is a better explanation than E1 since it fits perfectly well the contrast class (C) and the 
relevance context (D). 
On the other hand, one could imagine also that:
(C’) The contrast class more specifically highlights “how is it that Paul’s wound led to cancer?”
In this alternative scenario, explanation E1 would be the better one since it would describe the molecular 
mechanisms at stake and how, for instance, a wound could impact the molecular expression of certain 
genes and thereby lead to cancer. 
In  this  fictitious scenario,  we see  the possibility for  the would-be TOFT explanation E2 to be a good 
explanation whereas the SMT explanation E1 would not be good or the other way around: the difference 
simply comes from the explanatory contrast class and the relevance context.
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biologists. It holds that in the light of these assumptions, for these inquirers’ questions, 
non-molecular, biological answers are adequately explanatory, and need no completion or 
correction by information from molecular biology” (2005, 44). In short, what matters is 
the adequacy of the explanation to the cognitive interest of the investigator. With this 
view  of  explanation,  epistemic  antireductionism  is  no  surprise.  This  is  a  view  that 
reductionists  can  easily  embrace,  for  epistemic  antireductionism  can  be  hold  by 
reductionists to reflect the temporary limits of our knowledge as well as the limitations of 
our cognitive capacities and the particular interests we have in framing questions. 
In  our  view  therefore,  the  core  of  the  problem  of  explanatory  reduction  in 
carcinogenesis  has often been misled for a problem of providing a  good explanation, 
meaning either a true explanation (in the sense of ‘having a good probability to be true’) 
or an appropriate explanation (in the sense of fitting the contrast class and the relevance 
context), as exemplified by the criticisms of the SMT from proponents of the TOFT. We 
propose that a more appropriate strategy should instead be for the TOFT proponents to 
exhibit an E2, that would be not only good, but also indeed non explanatorily reducible, 
i.e. that could not be reformulated by appealing to explanations formulated in molecular 
biology, chemistry or physics (lower levels) whatever proponents of the SMT might try. 
To our knowledge, such an example of explanation E2 remains to be exhibited, as well as 
the  impossibility  proof  to  reformulate  it  in  molecular  biology,  chemistry  or  physics 
together with structural information. 
5. Organicism and ontological implications
Beyond  methodological  and  epistemological  aspects  of  reductionism,  the 
organicist/reductionist debate in carcinogenesis sometimes ventures in the territories of 
ontological claims, as is the case with consequences of the organicist stance with respect 
to emergence and downward causation. Indeed, the organicist view adopted by Soto and 
Sonnenschein acknowledges and accepts “the existence of emergent phenomena” (Soto 
and Sonnenschein 2005, 104). The question that immediately follows is of course: which 
kind  of  emergence  is  at  stake  here  and  what  are  the  phenomena  exhibiting  this 
emergence? Emergence has been and still is a mater of much debate among philosophers 
of science. Various concepts of emergence have been developed, weaker versions being 
compatible  with  a  reductionist  view while  stronger  versions  not.  Stephan  (1999)  for 
instance distinguishes six varieties of emergence. Among these six versions, three stand 
out as major options: weak emergence, synchronic emergence and diachronic structure 
emergence,  all  of  these  versions  positing  physical  monism (i.e.  entities  classified  as 
emergent  are  instantiated  by  systems  consisting  solely  of  physical  parts)  as  well  as 
synchronic determination (i.e.  the fact that there can be no difference in the systemic 
properties  without  there  being  differences  in  the  properties  of  the  parts  or  their 
arrangements).5 Let us recall briefly these three major options. 
5 The other three versions can be considered as variants of these three major ones and are not of central  
interest to our discussion: in addition to weak emergence, synchronic emergence and diachronic structure 
emergence,  Stephan  identifies  weak  diachronic  emergence,  strong  diachronic  emergence  and  strong 
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Weak emergence is the thesis according to which emergent properties are  systemic 
properties,  i.e.  properties  possessed by the system but  by no part  of  it.  Examples  of 
weakly emergent  properties  are  therefore properties  such as ‘walking’,  ‘reproducing’, 
‘having  a  sensation  of  pain’.  They  are  typically  opposed  to  so-called  hereditary 
properties, i.e. properties possessed by the system itself and, as well, by some or all of its 
parts;  such  hereditary  properties  include  for  instance  ‘having  a  velocity’.  Weak 
emergentism  is  compatible  with  contemporary  reductionist  approaches.  The  second 
perspective is the one of synchronic emergentism which central thesis is the irreducibility 
of properties of the system. As defined by Stephan, “a systemic property is irreducible if 
(a) it is neither micro- nor macro-scopically behaviorally analyzable, or if (b) the specific 
behavior of the system’s components, over which the systemic property supervenes, does 
not  follow  from  the  components’  behavior  in  isolation  or  in  other  (simpler) 
constellations” (1999, 52-53). Whereas the unanalyzability criterion refers to secondary 
qualities and phenomenal qualities such as colors or smells and induces no specific causal 
consequence,  the second criterion  appears  to  imply a challenging case of ‘downward 
causation’.  Indeed,  since knowledge of the components’  behavior  – in isolation  or in 
other  constellations  – is  not enough to deduce the behavior  of the system,  and since 
within physicalism one cannot appeal to other external factors, then there must be some 
causal  influence  from  the  system  itself  onto  its  components.  Diachronic  structure  
emergence is the third major variant of emergence that Stephan identifies. Two features 
best characterize it: novelty and unpredictability. In this case, properties are emergent if 
they are genuinely novel in the sense that they appear for the first time, and unpredictable 
in the sense that they are governed by laws attributed to deterministic chaos. 
Going back to carcinogenesis, the emergence involved in the organicist view of Soto 
and Sonnenschein is such that investigations or “incursions into lower levels must be 
followed  by  a  synthesis  of  how  lower  level  phenomena  bear  upon  upper  level 
phenomena” (2005, 104), implying that lower level phenomena somehow rest upon upper 
level ones, at least to a certain extent, and that, incidentally, lower level phenomena are 
causally dependent on upper level ones. To support this claim, Soto and Sonnenschein do 
not offer any example from carcinogenesis yet borrow one from morphogenesis: it is a 
case in which the activation of a gene within a group of cells is triggered by an increase 
in pressure due to growth and expansion of another group of cells (Farge 2003).6 Based 
on their interpretation of this example, Soto and Sonnenschein infer that emergence and 
downward causation should likely be included in the organicist stance; they specifically 
indicate  that the explanative “causal  chain,  from a molecular  event  to physical  stress 
inducing the next molecular event appears as an emergent […] acting as a downward 
cause” (2005, 115). In this case, the main criterion for appealing to emergence is not a 
matter of a systemic property that would be possessed by the tissues; it is therefore not a 
diachronic structure emergence. Please refer to Stephan (1999) for more details.
6 The example under consideration concerns the work of biologist Emmanuel Farge on how developmental 
gene  expression  can  be  mechanically  regulated  by  morphogenetic  movements.  In  his  work,  Farge 
demonstrates how the application of a mechanical force – or a pressure – upon certain surface cells of a  
Drosophila embryo induces the expression of the ‘Twist gene’ around the entire dorsal-ventral axis and 
results in the ventralization of the embryo (see Farge 2003; Brouzès and Farge 2004). 
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matter of weak emergence as defined by Stephan. On the other hand, the issues at stake 
are neither issues of novelty nor of unpredictability in principle; therefore the version of 
emergence under consideration here is not one of diachronic structure emergence either. 
Indeed, the key reason for appealing to emergence appears to be the need to account for 
downward causation, a typical trait characteristic of synchronic emergence. 
Yet,  to  which  extent  can  the  phenomena  and  scientific  experiments  under 
consideration  here  be  interpreted  solely  in  terms  of  downward  causation?  Soto  and 
Sonnenschein acknowledge that “there are many interactions that occur simultaneously to 
maintain the structure of a tissue; hence it is practically impossible to sort out cause and 
effect in a way that would precisely reveal whether emergents have true causal agency” 
(2005, 115). So then, why appeal to downward causation? Is upward causation simply not 
enough? Looking more deeply into the morphogenetic example borrowed by Soto and 
Sonnenschein  to  justify  downward  causation,  one  can  indeed  wonder  whether  the 
phenomena could not as well be interpreted in terms of regular upward causation. The 
issue as framed by Soto and Sonnenschein appears as if an upper level phenomenon (cell 
multiplication) induces a lower level phenomenon (gene expression). We argue that a 
different account could be made as follows: cell multiplication might be the result of a 
process of cell division that is itself orchestrated by the internal molecular machinery of 
each individual cell; the outcome of this machinery results in the more or less twofold 
increase of the number of cellular molecules, and therefore, roughly, a twofold increase 
of physical volume; yet, if the volume available to the cells is somehow constrained, the 
increase in volume induces an increase in pressure, hence potentially a change in cellular 
shape and in turn different concentration gradients within a cell, depending for instance 
on molecules local production and usage sites. It is then perfectly plausible to imagine 
that a change in concentration could affect the expression of a gene, which, after all is 
nothing  more  than  the  result  of  a  complex  chemical  reaction.  The  complete  causal 
account would therefore be: a lower level event (gene expression) causes another lower 
level event (gene and molecular duplication) which result in an upper level event (cell 
multiplication) as well as in a physical event (increase of volume); this physical event 
causes other physical events (increase in pressure, change in cellular shape) which in turn 
has a causal incidence on a lower level event (change in chemical gradients, impact on 
chemical kinetics and gene expression).7 
On this account, a causal explanation can perfectly be formulated by using only lower 
level events (molecular interactions) and physical events (change in volume, pressure). 
Appeal  to  upper  level  events  (cellular  or  tissue  interactions  or  movements)  is  not 
required,  and even if  a ‘downward causation explanation’  were to be formulated,  for 
instance stating that the gene expression (lower level event) is triggered by moving cells 
due to cell multiplication (upper level event), this would not be a problematic case of 
7 In a similar fashion, Rosenberg (2005) argues that the formation or mal-formation of a chick-limb can be  
accounted for simply by appealing to upward causation, whereas Kitcher (1984) had presented this example 
as a biological case of downward causation. Also, in cancer research, Jacks and Weinberg (2002) provide 
an ‘upward causation compatible’ interpretation of the specific work of Bissell et al initially formulated as 
a matter of tissue organization. Morange (2005) also believes that an upward-causation explanation of the 
example borrowed by Soto and Sonnenschein is fully possible.
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downward causation since it would remain, as already shown, perfectly compatible with 
an ‘upward causation explanation’. This would indeed remind us of the ‘celadon vase’ 
example of Kim (1999): the falling vase (upper level event)  hits an air  molecule and 
changes  its  momentum  (lower  level  event).  In  this  case  the  ‘downward  causation 
explanation’ is perfectly reducible and non problematic: as Kim puts it, it is a case of 
‘non-reflexive downward causation’. Even Farge himself, who claims to be investigating 
“how  morphogenetic  movements  could  modulate  the  expression  of  developmental 
genes”, believes that it is necessary to decipher the “underlying molecular mechanism of 
mechano-transcription”  (2004,  367).  Of  course,  we  could  imagine  a  slightly  more 
complicated biological case with a kind of retroactive feedback: the upper level event 
(moving  cells  due  to  cell  multiplication)  would  induce  a  lower  level  event  (gene 
expression) which would in turn affect the upper level event (increase/decrease of cell 
multiplication rate). Would this be problematic? Most certainly not, as it would fit the 
case of ‘diachronic reflexive downward causation’ proposed by Kim, since events trigger 
one  another  in  a  sequential  fashion.  What  would  be  more  problematic  would  be  an 
example of ‘synchronic reflexive downward causation’, even if Kim doubts that it could 
be given a coherent sense. Thus, although the organicist stance posits a synchronic type 
of emergentism and strongly advocates downward causation, the experimental evidence 
of such downward causation leaves the door open to another interpretation compatible 
with upward causation and reductionism. To our knowledge therefore, a real example of 
problematic  downward causation  of  the  synchronic  reflexive  type  still  remains  to  be 
exhibited in the case of carcinogenesis, like in many other areas of science.
6. Beyond an apparent incommensurability
Having shed light on the organicist/reductionist debate in carcinogenesis from the three 
different perspectives of methodology, epistemology and ontology, which lessons can we 
now learn? First, it appears that a strong divergence of approach does indeed concern 
heuristics and research strategy, especially as it has been pursued so far. Second, from an 
epistemological point of view, it appears that the debate is best understood as an issue of 
‘explanation reduction’, but also that arguments on cancer explanations aim more at their 
‘trueness’  and  ‘appropriateness’  rather  then  their  ‘(ir)reducibility’.  Third,  from  an 
ontological  point of view,  we contend that  the synchronic  emergence  entailed by the 
organicist stance is not tenable, or at least not in the form it is proposed. In our view 
therefore, the three-tiered analysis of the organicist/reductionist debate in carcinogenesis 
shows that the gap between the two approaches is not as wide and clear-cut as might first 
have seemed. 
Is this gap enough then to argue for a fundamental incompatibility of both theories to a 
point of incommensurability as suggested by Soto and Sonnenschein (2005, 114)? If one 
sticks to a very strict and restrictive formulation of each theory, that is, if we take the 
SMT as a theory looking solely for genetic causes of cancer and the TOFT as a theory 
investigating solely tissue organization causes of cancer, then the two theories may well 
appear incommensurable for they would appeal to mutually incompatible explanations 
and causal factors: all laws of the SMT would only be formulated in terms of genes and 
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molecules, notions absent from the TOFT; on the other hand, all laws of the TOFT would 
appeal to tissues and tissue organization, terms which do not exist in the SMT. Yet, we 
argue that one cannot stick to such strict formulations of both carcinogenesis theories, 
and for two reasons. 
First, both the SMT and the TOFT are theories in progress. Everyday, cancer still kills 
and, as a matter of fact, none of these two theories can stand out and claim to provide a 
complete  explanatory  framework  for  carcinogenesis.  One  could  even  question  their 
naming  as  theories:  as  such,  both  the  SMT and the  TOFT are  incomplete  candidate 
explanations for carcinogenesis; they are hypotheses being continuously reworked and 
submitted to experimental test and refutation; their formalism is continuously adapting to 
new experimental evidence, making it impossible to stick to such a precise formulation. 
Second, as new research pathways are investigated, one can wonder whether the two 
theories will indeed remain in their  initial  narrow explanatory realms or whether they 
might each help to shed a different light on the same issue, and thereby converge. Recent 
evidence  would  point  in  this  last  direction.  Indeed,  not  only  are  the  two  theories 
expanding outside of their initial starting paradigms, they are also starting to collide and 
overlap at their periphery. Weinberg for instance no longer points at a unique tumor cell 
for  cancer  explanation;  rather,  he  acknowledges  the  importance  of  the  interactions 
between  tumor  cells  and  their  neighboring  normal  cells  in  carcinogenesis:  “cancer 
development  depends  upon  changes  in  the  heterotypic  interactions  between  incipient 
tumor cells and their normal neighbors” (Hanahan and Weinberg 2000, 67). Moreover, 
the SMT appears to recognize the importance of interactions between epithelial cells and 
the stroma (Jacks and Weinberg 2002), and starts to make sense, at the molecular level, 
of cell-to-cell interactions within tissues (Orimo  et al, 2005). On the other hand, after 
having assessed the role of tissue organization in carcinogenesis, the TOFT needs to dive 
into the search for some molecular explanations: Soto and Sonnenschein recognize that, 
since altered communication among cells is at the core of the TOFT, “one would study 
how specific alterations in APC, catenins, cadherins and hDd affect the development of 
intestinal crypt and give rise to polyps” (Soto and Sonnenschein 2005, 114). Hence, as a 
matter  of fact,  the TOFT needs to expand its  explanatory paradigm from the level of 
tissue organization down to the level of molecules involved in cell-to-cell interactions, 
while the SMT is looking beyond the cell and the faulty gene to cell-to-cell interactions 
within tissues. Therefore, both the SMT and the TOFT are currently colliding on some 
common ground and could very well be heading in the same direction in the future. It 
even appears that a number of research papers on carcinogenesis could be interpreted as 
attempts  at  formulating  synthetic  positions  that  would  incorporate  claims  from  both 
theoretical approaches or at least build bridges between the two initial paradigms  (for 
instance, to name a few: Folkman et al., 2000; Bissell and Radisky, 2001; Thiery, 2002; 
Wiseman and Werb, 2002, Jacks and Weinberg 2002). This could the sign of a trend 
towards a unification of both theories into a larger cancer theory, involving the genetic 
circuitry within cells as well as the organizational patterns of cells within tissues and their 
molecular interactions. It might also be the sign of another change in cancer research, 
going along the pathways of ‘systems biology’. 
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Indeed, the ever-growing extraordinary complexity of factors uncovered so far seems 
to be pointing at multiple and intricate pathways for carcinogenesis: Han and Weinberg 
indicate for instance that the recent application of transcriptional profiling to cancer has 
documented changes in the expression of  thousands of genes as normal cells undergo 
transformation  into  their  neoplastic  derivatives  (Han  and  Weinberg,  2002).  This  is 
potentially shifting the focus from ‘which entities – molecules, tissues – cause cancer?’ to 
‘how  are  all  cancer-involved  entities  related  to  one  another  and  how  are  these 
relationships disrupted in the case of cancer?’. Reflecting on this general recent trend in 
biology, Keller (2005) suggests that the move towards ‘systems biology’ be accompanied 
by a change of conceptual framework resting on a dynamic and relational epistemology. 
Morange (2005) is also emphasizing the role of such new explanatory schemes and their 
articulation with more traditional  explanatory schemes of biology.  As more and more 
detailed investigations are carried out, very complex arrays  of explanatory factors are 
uncovered, involving ever-increasing numbers of entities appearing to be organized in 
complex  causal  relationships.  The  uncovering  of  numerous  interactions,  including 
retroactive  non-linear  ones,  across  many  levels  of  biological  information  calls  for 
studying with a ‘systems approach’ how these interactions simultaneously work together. 
Within this change of conceptual framework, explanations can no longer be framed in 
terms of genes,  cells  or tissues; rather,  they are formulated in terms of multitudes  of 
complex interactions among entities potentially pertaining to different biological levels 
and in ways that are familiar to computer science or to the science of complex systems. 
What we contend here is that the study of carcinogenesis may very well be heading in the 
same direction. If this is so, cancer theories will shift their focus from looking at specific 
entities,  be  they  molecules  or  tissues,  to  picturing  complex  networks  of  interactions. 
Explanations will no longer be framed in terms of faulty genes, malignant cells or tissue 
disorganization: they will depict an ever more accurate model of extremely complex and 
interacting  processes  potentially  ranging  across  several  levels  of  relevant  biological 
information, including physico-chemical variables if needed. 
Yet,  once  cancer  theory  has  shifted  to  a  ‘systems  biology’  framework,  what  will 
happen to the initial  problem of organicism/reductionism? From an epistemic point of 
view in particular, will the explanations put forward within a ‘systems biology cancer 
theory’  be  reducible  to  molecular  and  physico-chemical  explanations?  O’Malley  and 
Dupré (2005) view ‘systems biology’  as mainly composed of two research streams: a 
‘pragmatic  systems  biology’  emphasizing  large-scale  molecular  interactions  and 
compatible  with  physico-chemical  reductionism,  and  a  ‘systems-theoretic  biology’ 
emphasizing system principles and viewing them as synchronically emergent top-down 
constraints. Which stream will best characterize future cancer research? This is an open 
question that can only be answered by scientists. And the answer may, or may not, lead to 
the reappearance of emergentist  questions.  Yet this time such questions would not be 
framed in terms of biological levels (tissues, cells) but in terms of systemic properties 
(design principles) if any. 
We  also  propose  that  another  type  of  emergentist  questions  might  rise  from  a 
diachronic perspective shed on complex systems. For instance, this is typically the case 
for  cellular  automata,  and  this  has  led  Bedau  among  others  to  propose  a  form  of 
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diachronic structure emergence (Bedau 1997).8 What  could bring,  in the future,  some 
support  to  the  TOFT  line  of  argumentation  would  be  to  show  that  the  complete 
explanation of carcinogenesis would not only be a typical example of complex biological 
systems modeling, but would also imbed formal models exhibiting diachronic structure 
emergence, i.e. a form of computational incompressibility. In this case, emergence could 
percolate  from  models  of  complex  systems  into  carcinogenesis  explanations.  Yet, 
opposite  to  Soto  and  Sonnenschein  claim,  this  would  not  be  a  case  of  synchronic 
emergence entailing an ontological claim of downward causation. 
7. Conclusion
As we have seen, the study of carcinogenesis has become the ground of a passionate 
debate  between  researchers  not  only  interested  in  the  progress  of  their  scientific 
investigations  per  se but  also  reflecting  on  their  own  epistemological  stances.  The 
opposing stances of reductionism and organicism as used in cancer research have been 
discussed along three dimensions – methodological, epistemological and ontological – so 
as to clarify arguments used by both sides and measure the actual gap between the two 
stances. We therefore contend that the major difference between the two stances is best 
stated in terms of diverging heuristics whereas claims of explanation (ir)reducibility do 
not  appear convincingly stated;  in addition,  we argue that  the synchronic emergentist 
view of the organicist stance and its implications in terms of downward causation appear 
too  ontologically  loaded.  As  time  is  passing  by,  we  witness  a  trend  towards  a 
convergence  of  explanations  in  cancer  research:  bridges  are  tentatively built  between 
approaches, and ‘candidate theories’ are constantly reformulated to accommodate new 
experimental  evidence.  In  addition,  as  the  field  of  carcinogenesis  is  enriched  and 
enlarged, thereby becoming of an ever more tantalizing complexity, similar changes in 
the biological sciences calling for a new ‘systems biology’ might as well impact the way 
cancer theories are formulated; with such a change of conceptual framework, the two 
current candidate theories for carcinogenesis, the SMT as well as the TOFT, might very 
well leave way to a third candidate theory, a ‘systemic approach to carcinogenesis’. Time 
will tell. This approach might however enable two other forms of emergence to percolate 
back  into  carcinogenesis:  a  synchronic  emergence  relative  to  system  constraining 
principles,  and  a  diachronic  structure  emergence  relative  to  computational 
incompressibility. The question is open to scientific investigation.
Acknowledgements
This paper was triggered by extremely fruitful discussions with Ana Soto and Carlos 
Sonnenschein  following  seminars  and  meetings  keenly  organized  by  Paul-Antoine 
8 Bedau studies cellular automata and in particular Conway’s “game of life” (Bedau 1997); he calls ‘weak 
emergence’ the form of diachronic emergence exhibited by such models of complex systems. To avoid 
confusion with Stephan’s typology of emergence (Stephan 1999), we prefer to use ‘diachronic structure  
emergence’ in this case.
15
Preprint – final version published in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 57–73. URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698590701305792
Miquel. I also thank Michel Morange and Pierre-Alain Braillard for insightful comments 
on an earlier draft, and Jean Gayon for his thoughtful mentoring.
References
Ayala, F.J. 1974. Introduction. In Ayala F.J. and T. Dobzhansky (eds) Studies in the philosophy of biology.  
Reductionism and related problems. London: McMillan : vii-xix.
Bedau, M. 1997. Weak Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives: Mind, Causation, and World, 11: 375-399, 
Malden MA.: Blackwell.
Bissell, M.J. and D. Radisky. 2001. Putting tumors in context. Nature Reviews Cancer 1: 46-54.
Boveri, T. 1914. Zur Frage der Entstehung Maligner Tumoren. Jena: Fischer.
Brouzès,  E. and E. Farge. 2004. Interplay of mechanical  deformation and patterned gene expression in 
developing embryos. Current Opinion in Genetics & Development 14: 367–374.
Dolberg,  D.S and M.J.  Bissell.  1984.  Inability  of  Rous sarcoma virus  to  cause  sarcomas  in  the avian 
embryo. Nature 309: 552-556
Farge E. 2003. Mechanical induction of twist in the  Drosophila  foregut/stomodeal primordium.  Current  
Biology 13:1365-1377.
Folkman, J., P. Hahnfeld, L. Hlatky. 2000. Cancer: looking outside the genome. Nature Reviews Molecular  
Cell Biology 1: 76-79
Han, C.W. and R.A. Weinberg. 2002. Modeling the molecular circuitry of cancer, Nature Reviews Cancer 
2: 331-342.
Hanahan, D. and R.A. Weinberg. 2000. The hallmarks of cancer, Cell 100: 57-70.
Jacks, T. and R.A. Weinberg. 2002. Taking the study of cancer cell survival to a new dimension, Cell 111: 
923-925.
Khayat D. 2005. Nous allons changer la culture de la recherche sur le cancer, Le Monde, 23 May 2005.
Keller, E.F. 2005. The century beyond the gene, Journal of Biosciences 30(1): 3-10.
Kim, J. 1999. Making sense of emergence, Philosophical Studies 95: 3-36.
Kitcher, P. 1984. 1953 and all that, Philosophical Review 93: 335-373.
Maffini, M.V., A.M. Soto, J.M. Calabro, A.A. Ucci, C. Sonnenschein. 2004. The stroma as a crucial target 
in rat mammary gland carcinogenesis, Journal of Cell Science 117: 1495-1502.
Marcum, J.A. 2005. Metaphysical presuppositions and scientific practices: reductionism and organicism in 
cancer research, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19: 31-45.
Morange, M. 1997. From the Regulatory Vision of Cancer to the Oncogene Paradigm, 1975–1985, Journal  
of the History of Biology 30: 1–29.
Morange, M. 2005. Les secrets du vivant. Contre la pensée unique en biologie, Paris: La Découverte.
Needham, J. 1936. New advances in chemistry and biology of organized growth, Proceedings of the Royal  
Society of Biology 29:1577–1626.
Orimo,  A.,  P.B.  Gupta,  D.C.  Sgroi,  F.  Arenzana-Seisdedos,  T.  Delaunay,  R.  Naeem,  V.J.  Carey,  A.L. 
Richardson,  R.A.  Weinberg.  2005.  Stromal  Fibroblasts  Present  in  Invasive  Human  Breast 
Carcinomas Promote Tumor Growth and Angiogenesis through Elevated SDF-1/CXCL12 Secretion, 
Cell 121: 335-348.
O’Malley, M. and Dupré, J. 2005. Fundamental issues in systems biology, BioEssays, 27:1270-1276.
Nagel,  E.  1961.  The Structure of  Science.  Problems  in the  logic  of  scientific  explanation. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World.
Rosenberg, A. and D.M. Kaplan. 2005. How to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism about biology.  
Philosophy of Science 72: 43-68.
Schaffner, K. 1967. Approaches to reduction. Philosophy of science 34(2): 137-147.
Sonnenschein, C. and A. Soto. 1999. The Society of Cells: Cancer and Control of Cell Proliferation. New 
York: Springer Verlag.
16
Preprint – final version published in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 57–73. URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698590701305792
Sonnenschein, C. and A. Soto. 2000. The somatic mutation theory of carcinogenesis:  why it should be 
dropped and replaced. Molecular Carcinogenesis 29: 1-7.
Soto, A. and C. Sonnenschein. 2004. The somatic mutation theory of cancer: growing problems with the 
paradigm? BioEssays 26: 1097-1107.
Soto, A. and C. Sonnenschein. 2005. Emergentism as a default: cancer as a problem of tissue organization,  
Journal of Biosciences 30(1): 103-118.
Stephan, A. 1999. Varieties of emergentism, Evolution and Cognition 5(1): 49-59.
Thiery,  J.P. 2002. Epithelial-mesenchymal transitions in tumour progression.  Nature Reviews Cancer 2: 
442-454.
Van Fraassen, B. C. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Van Helvoort, T. 1999. A century of research into the cause of cancer:  is the new oncogene paradigm  
revolutionary? History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 21(3): 293-330
Waddington, C.H. 1935. Cancer and the theory of organizers, Nature (London) 135:606–608.
Weinberg, R.A. 1998 One Renegade Cell: How Cancer Begins. New York: Basic Books
Wiseman, B.S. and Z. Werb. 2002. Stromal effects on mammary gland development and breast cancer. 
Science 296: 1046-1049.
17
